The Army Equipping Strategy
INTRODUCTION

This White Paper describes the ends, ways, and means to achieve an effective and affordable Equipping Strategy for the Army. It establishes an enduring view of how the Army will adjust its equipping processes, organizations, and expectations in a cost-conscious era of fiscal challenge. It also provides equipping guidance to facilitate the Army’s transition to an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)-based force. The overarching challenge for the Army is to carefully manage its equipment resources to meet the demands of equipping units rotating to war through cyclic force management.

BACKGROUND

The challenges facing Army Equipping have changed significantly over the past years, and the ways in which we equip the force have changed even more significantly. Since 2001, Army Equipping faced:

- **Necessity to Adapt**: We must always remain more agile than our enemy, and so we have constantly adapted our doctrine and changed our equipping capabilities. The majority of the recent Requests for Forces that the Army receives from the Combatant Commanders are considered “ad hoc,” requiring a unique assembly of personnel and equipment capabilities.

- **Persistent Conflict**: The ongoing nature of operations means that we are using our equipment more than ever – our inventory is experiencing usage rates up to five or more times greater than the rate planned for in a peacetime environment. We need to take this into account for future planning purposes. The Army must aggressively identify more realistic usage rates based on current operations to plan better for equipment reset during continued persistent conflict.

- **Growth**: Army equipping has been challenged with growth in equipping requirements. This growth is associated with the crucial efforts to meet the needs of Irregular Warfare by adopting modular formations and growing the force. From 2003 to 2011, the number of items authorized on Unit Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) grew by 107 percent. This growth can also be measured in the increased demand for technology and the need to equip Soldiers performing decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations with needed survivability and lethality to operate on today’s battlefield. With no “rear areas” on today’s battlefield, each Soldier’s individual equipment must provide a base level of protection and lethality never before resourced.

- **Modernization and Recapitalization**: The Army must replace or recapitalize aging equipment to preserve our advantages and ensure future capabilities. Our equipment inventories will always be a mix of new, fully modernized equipment and acceptable substitutes.

- **Fiscal Constraints**: The emerging reduction in available resources and the simultaneous increase in legitimate requirements compound the Army’s challenge to equip the force. We must continue to adopt new ways to conserve resources while preserving the decisive edge for our Soldiers going into combat.

ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY

**OBJECTIVE—ENDS**

*An affordable equipping strategy to ensure Soldiers operating within ARFORGEN have the right equipment amounts, types, and modernization to meet their mission requirements – whether in combat, training to go to combat, operating as part of the Army’s generating force, or conducting Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HLD/DSCA) missions.*
The Army’s equipping goal is to ensure that Soldiers always have the equipment they need to execute their assigned mission as they progress through the cyclic readiness model. That is equipping balance. Balancing growing requirements and fiscal constraints across all areas within a cyclical readiness model to provide trained and ready units to Combatant Commanders is critical. Our operational demands are stressing our force, and while our Soldiers have rightly received much of the Army’s focus, the Army must also address how it will restore equipping balance.

Since we began to develop modular formations and implement the ARFORGEN model, we have developed a strategy to meet the variable equipping needs of a force being managed under cyclic readiness. The Army’s strategy is to *Equip to Mission* requirements: As units move through the ARFORGEN cycle their missions’ change, as do their equipment requirements. We must manage equipment to ensure units have the right types and amounts at the right times.

To enable this, the Army procures quantities of equipment to a level referred to as the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO). The AAO is currently calculated as the sum of requirements for equipment documented in Army Requirements Documents (TOEs, Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs)), plus Operational Readiness and Repair Cycle Floats, Army Prepositioned Stocks, Operational Projects, Army War Reserve Stock, and War Reserves Supporting Allies. For most commodities of equipment, it is imperative to procure the AAO as we define it today to have sufficient equipment available to support the varying levels of equipment across the ARFORGEN phases, as described in the later sections of this paper and account for the emerging and enduring requirements of equipment occupied in Reset and Transportation. These additional demands are expressed as “Friction” and will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
The pressure of persistent conflict over the past years has required the Army to adapt its equipping practices. We are transforming the way we do business from a Cold War era strategy to a full spectrum ARFORGEN-based strategy as illustrated in the following tables:

### THE ARMY EQUIPPING STRATEGY – WAYS and MEANS

The Army Equipping Strategy encompasses three major lines of operation. The first one, the unit-focused main effort, is ARFORGEN-Based Equipping. The second is focused on the equipping phases described above and is called Managing Friction. The third is targeted at institutional processes, and is called Building Enduring Readiness. This strategy provides a framework by which the Army, in full partnership between the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR), can more effectively manage limited equipment assets to meet mission requirements.

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### Cold War Era Strategy

- **Tiered** readiness and Tiered Modernization based on G-3 Master Priorities List – meant some units equipped well, others less well
  - Goal = Equip to MTOE, Modernize MTOE based on position on G-3 Priority List
    - Equip 100% units
    - 100% of MTOE
    - 100% of the time
  - Equip to unit design – MTOE
  - Equipment normally remained in one unit from initial fielding until it was washed out
  - Minimal recognition of Reset (floats) and Transportation within the Acquisition Objective
  - Homeland Defense requirements not understood, recognized or managed
  - Requirements approved, then resourcing cost considered

### Full Spectrum ARFORGEN-Based Strategy

- **Cyclical** readiness – means all units equipped based on their position in the ARFORGEN cycle and their mission – Regardless of Component
  - Goal = Equip to Mission and ARFORGEN Phase
    - Reset: starts with zero readiness expectation; equipment levels increase to prepare for Train/Ready
    - Train/Ready: 80% growing to 90%
    - Available: 90% plus
    - Commodity based resourcing strategies
  - Equip to unit mission, including specialized equipment for mission (TPE and MEEL)
  - Equipment is in constant motion to meet ARFORGEN requirements. Requires dedicated management by AMC and their AFSBs
  - Reset and Transportation requirements are recognized as enduring – 20% of equip not in units
  - Homeland Defense capabilities are recognized, resourced, and priority managed (CDU LINS)
  - Requirements are reviewed on the "front-end" with life cycle and full acquisition costs considered

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*Figure 1. Equipping Strategy Comparison*
ARFORGEN-Based Equipping

Success in the ARFORGEN-Based Equipping Line of Operation is measured by the ability of the Army to meet the equipping goals, by phase and unit type.

ARFORGEN-Based Equipping is the main effort. The way by which the Army addresses this line of operation is by managing equipment based on defined equipping goals linked to each phase of the ARFORGEN cycle. Analysis has shown that these goals are achievable by 2011 for most equipment capability sets. These represent aggregate goals; the specific allocation of resources against these goals will continue to reflect current Army priorities, as reflected in the Army Resourcing Priority List. As equipping realities change, these goals will be re-addressed and equipping guidance will be updated. Below are the Army goals for each phase of ARFORGEN. They apply equally to both Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component. However, throughout the ARFORGEN cycle, ARNG units will be properly equipped to adequately meet their obligations in support of Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities. All Components will continue to manage their individual inventories of equipment, and, normally, equipment will remain within its Component.

As operational demands lessen over time, resulting in increased dwell time for units between deployments, the Army will adjust its ARFORGEN model to include four (or perhaps more) ARFORGEN phases. The Army’s Readiness Core Enterprise (RCE) is developing a strategy to address increasing dwell time across the force. This strategy acknowledges the need to remain flexible as dwell times change over time based on demand. However, for the time being, the Army is using a three force pool ARFORGEN model and will equip units as described below.

The figure below illustrates the ARFORGEN-Based equipping strategy supporting the Army in this cyclical readiness model. Below the figure are detailed explanations of each current ARFORGEN pool (Reset, Train/Ready, and Available) and their associated equipping level goals. This strategy articulates equipping level metrics in terms of a percentage of MTOE authorizations filled. Since the actual S-ratings depend on how commanders distribute their equipment, using percentages provides a more reliable measure of equipment fill at the aggregate level. The equipping level goals in each phase of ARFORGEN do, however, correspond with the S-ratings used in unit status reporting (90% - S1, 80% - S2).
• **Reset**—Units in Reset should have minimal specific equipping expectations. However, this does not mean that they will not have equipment. Units can expect to have much, but probably not all, of their individual equipment and other equipment that is not subject to Reset. The Army will deliver and/or field equipment to units following the Reset phase to prepare them for entry into the Train Pool. The delivery of this equipment will require careful synchronization with the arrival of new personnel into the unit, to ensure that the unit is prepared to receive, account for, store, and maintain the equipment.
• **Train/Ready** —
  o The Army will provide equipment judiciously to units to support training requirements to ensure it can adequately equip units in the other force pools. Initially, units in Train-Ready can expect to enter this phase filled to 80 percent based on MTOE authorizations. When developed, future processes will ensure they are equipped to training and operational requirements, dwell time, priority, and mission.
  o Upon further analysis, we may also identify certain commodities or pieces of equipment for which it is appropriate to field at either reduced quantities or later in the Train/Ready phase to realize Army efficiencies and savings that can then be applied to other more urgent needs. The Army will execute this variable management of commodities based on operationally-based cost modeling and input from commanders.
  o Units in the Train-Ready Pool, unless otherwise directed, will be equipped based on their MTOE, but only to a level of fill as described in this strategy. This is essential to provide the Army strategic depth and flexibility. As units approach the Available phase, they will adjust their equipping levels to meet the specific requirements of their directed mission.

• **Available**—Units entering the Available phase will be equipped to “90%+” based on their assigned mission. Some equipment authorizations will be specific to that mission and will not reflect what is authorized in the unit’s MTOE. These variances from the MTOE may be changes in the quantity required for equipment that the unit would normally have, or they may be additional equipment (or higher levels of modernization) that are not documented on the unit’s MTOE. This level of fill can be referred to as “90%+.” The equipment needed to move to “90%+” may be provided before deployment, but in many cases the final equipping will be provided by Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) or by other equipment sets. The equipping standard will be the full MTOE requirements at the 90 percent of fill for units that enter the Available phase without an assigned mission.

• **High Priority Non-Rotational Units** – The Army has units that do not rotate through an ARFORGEN cycle, but are forward stationed, or otherwise considered high priority. These include theater committed forces, Army Service Component Command Headquarters, Army Special Operations Forces, and other units. Initially, we will fill these units to minimum of 90 percent for each equipment authorization and 100 percent for Pacing Items. Levels of fill for Line Item Numbers (LINs) in short supply across the Army may also be at less than 90 percent. When developed, future processes will ensure they are equipped to operational requirement, priority, and mission.

• **Generating Force** – The Army has deliberately chosen to accept risk in equipping Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), installations, and other TDA activities in the Generating Force. Initially, the goal is to ensure a minimum of 65 percent fill, based on mission, against all authorizations. When developed, future processes will ensure they are equipped to levels to achieve their training requirements. In most cases, the level of fill will be much higher. Army prioritization processes, like the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B), will be used to determine whether specific capabilities or specific units need to be filled at a higher level. Specific focus will be placed on ensuring that the Army’s Institutional Training process is equipped sufficiently to meet the expected training demand. This support to the training base may come through the outright delivery or the loan of equipment to Army schools and training centers.
**Critical Dual Use (CDU) Equipment**

- A subset of the capabilities resident in unit designs are critical for the execution of HLD missions. Only some capabilities, referred to as CDU, are critical for the execution of the ARNG’s HLD/DSCA missions. The DCS G-3/5/7 approves the CDU list.

- The Army’s goal is to ensure that ARNG units are equipped properly with CDU capabilities to execute HLD/DSCA missions effectively. In the case of the ARNG, these include both federal missions and missions in support of States and Governors. A CDU list of equipment capabilities exists, and is used to measure ARNG capabilities for domestic missions.

- The Army remains committed to ensuring that, as a component, the ARNG always has the level of equipment fill necessary to meet domestic operational requirements. The Army’s goal is to equip the ARNG with at least 80 percent of its CDU requirements. The ARNG will continue to manage capability distribution to ensure their ability to meet their HLD/DSCA missions as well as the equipping requirements of their deployed Soldiers.

**MANAGING FRICITION**

*Success in the Managing Friction Line of Operation is measured by how well the Army can see its own equipment inventories and make informed management decisions about how to allocate that inventory to build Army readiness, how to meet the goals established in the ARFORGEN-Based Equipping Line of Operation, and what new equipping goals will be feasible over time.*

The second line of operation addresses Friction. Friction is caused by a significant percentage of Army equipment that is, and will continue to be, unavailable to fill unit MTOE or TDA authorizations because it is in transportation or reset. Friction is manageable and can be minimized but not eliminated. The Army and RAND have done extensive studies which suggest that roughly 20 percent of Army inventory, within certain capabilities, can be characterized as “Friction.”

There are five key **means** by which the Army Manages the Friction Line of Operation:

- In general terms the Army must procure enough equipment to meet AAO. Procuring to the AAO provides the Army the ability to mitigate friction while meeting the ARFORGEN equipping requirements outlined in this strategy. Some observers believe we can achieve equipping efficiencies by purchasing less equipment than the AAO requires because units need less equipment in the early phases of the ARFORGEN cycle. However, they fail to account for the requirement to provide some level of operational or strategic depth above and beyond the forces in the Available ARFORGEN pool and they also fail to account for the impact of Friction. Finally, not procuring equipment to AAO levels could in legitimate requirements compound the Army’s challenge to equip the force. We must continue to adopt new ways to conserve resources while preserving the decisive edge for our Soldiers going into combat. have significant impacts on the ability of the Army to respond to changing equipping requirements in active theaters (i.e., Operational Needs Statements), compromise our operational and strategic depth, and weaken surge capability in the Department of Defense (DoD) industrial base. Any decision made to procure to less than the AAO will only be made with full consideration of the impacts of this decision on future Army readiness and our ability to properly train and respond to contingencies.
• The Army will continue to pursue full transparency and asset visibility in its equipment inventories. The goal of this effort is to create an Enterprise-wide accountability process that is capable of tracking equipment through its entire life cycle. Transparency can be defined as a process that provides accountability and traceability from budget submission through funding authorization and on to procurement and delivery to Army users. Asset visibility provides the ability to track that equipment through all stages of the equipment life cycle, as it is used across the force, regardless of location of the equipment (in Theater, outside the Continental United States and within the Continental United States, in units, in depots, in transit, or in an equipping pool). Together, transparency and asset visibility ensure that the Army and its Components – as full partners in the transparency and visibility processes – have the information they need to manage and allocate the available equipment inventory efficiently and in accordance with Army priorities and statutory directions and obligations.

• The Army will ensure that the equipment it allocates to equipping sets is included in its overall readiness reporting. As has been discussed, a large percentage of Army equipment is in sets. In some cases, this includes critical mission unique equipment not documented on Army MTOEs, but which provide essential capabilities that should be captured in readiness reporting. It is imperative that we document and account for this equipment properly to convey an accurate overall picture of the Army’s equipment resourcing to responsible leaders and other external audiences. We must also provide an accurate assessment of the Army’s ability to accomplish its National Military Strategy missions. Below is an explanation of the different types of equipment sets the Army currently uses to manage equipment resources to generate a more agile and versatile force.

  o Left Behind Equipment (LBE): The goal is for LBE to remain linked to units. While that equipment remains LBE, it must be reported as on-hand by the owning non-deployed unit. This does not alter the ability to transfer equipment from an LBE account to another critical Army need, such as equipping another unit preparing to deploy. Once formally transferred from their LBE account, units would not report this equipment. Guidance on reporting of LBE by deployed units will be published at a later date.

  o Pre-Deployment Training Equipment (PDTE): This equipment that has been diverted from MTOE units in all Components is used to provide theater / mission-specific training opportunities. The goal is to establish an association between PDTE and unit authorizations for readiness reporting purposes.

  o Unit Provided Training Equipment (UPTE)/Mobilization Training Center Sets (MTC): The UPTE is ARNG-owned equipment designated to meet Post Mobilization training equipment requirements. The USAR equivalent is MTC. In both cases some of the equipment is centrally stored, maintained, and managed by the components. Other UPTE/MTC is transported to the mobilization station from a unit’s home station with the purpose of completing Post Mobilization training equipment requirements, after which it is returned to the home station. The equipment remains on the owning units’ property books and they continue to report its status.
Theater Provided Equipment (TPE): This equipment is focused on a unit’s Assigned Mission versus its Core Mission, as defined by its MTOE. Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, is being revised and will provide the necessary guidance on how to report equipping readiness accurately against a unit’s Assigned Mission, including capturing the role of mission-unique TPE.

In addition to the above measures, commanders at all echelons must strive to achieve the highest possible Equipment On Hand readiness using all measures at their disposal. This includes ensuring that all authorized items are requisitioned properly, that inventories of on-hand equipment are accurate, and that authorized substitutes are reflected as “on-hand.”

• The Army must find ways to foster effective equipment stewardship. Army equipment will be in constant motion in and out of units, depots, and equipment sets. We cannot allow a “Rental Car” mentality to become pervasive. We must ensure Soldiers have the time, expertise, and resources to execute their necessary maintenance and accountability tasks.

• Continuous Reset and Improved Life Cycle Management. An ARFORGEN-based Army, operating in an era of persistent conflict, will always have some portion of its equipment in Reset. Great strides have been made in the Reset process. Sustainment level Reset conducted at Army depots and installation maintenance activities has been optimized using principles such as Lean Six Sigma, Prime Vendor Supply Chain partnerships, and other innovative concepts. Field level Reset has benefitted from the deployment of specialized teams from the National level. The Army must continue to seek such efficiencies in the Reset of equipment, examining the entire supply chain, from losing unit to gaining unit, to ensure we are achieving a “Velocity of Reset” commensurate with the demands of an ARFORGEN-based Army. The Army must also address life cycle management improvements to enable the Army to manage Friction better.

BUILDING ENDURING READINESS

Success in the Building Enduring Readiness Line of Operations is measured by the Army’s ability to continue to improve the utility of equipping goals and guidance over time as we understand better how varying levels and types of equipment affect Army readiness in all phases of ARFORGEN. This will enable the Army to bring resources and requirements into better synchronization with cyclic equipping readiness requirements.

Building Enduring Readiness is the third line of operation. The ways by which to build enduring readiness are focused on Army management policies and structure. In the long run, the Army will address how it is going to ensure its requirements validation, prioritization, and resourcing processes remain synchronized. An important part of this effort is the Army-wide effort to transform the Institutional Army.

Since concepts like Friction, Equipment Sets, and ARFORGEN-Based Equipping will be enduring; it will be important for the Army to ensure that they are recognized explicitly in Army requirements and resourcing processes. Much of what is needed to foster Enduring Readiness is new as the Army continues to understand ARFORGEN. The Army has performed essential, creative, and effective work to develop new ways of dealing with equipping challenges brought on by the current strategic environment. This line of operation is focused on capturing that good work to integrate and improve it.
The Army must continue to scrutinize new and existing requirements. The next several years will encompass the final implementation of both the Army’s Modular Redesign and of Growth in the Army’s end strength. It is also a time when the budget environment is becoming more uncertain. Affordability and Risk will be critical issues as the Army looks to move through Balance and into Enduring Readiness, while fielding the new Ground Combat Vehicle and continuing to Reset and recapitalize. There must be explicit decision criteria in equipping decisions at all levels. Decisions concerning Unit Design and the Basis of Issue for equipment must be fully resource-informed. The Army will reexamine some of its desired concepts and introduce new capabilities in more affordable ways, e.g., innovative pooling strategies or training strategies. We should also consider acquiring increments of capability in “ARFORGEN-sized” packages, limiting our procurements to technologies that demonstrate maturity and make more frequent follow-on “buy decisions” that give us the opportunity to insert technology and can more readily adapt to threats. in the Reset of equipment, examining the entire supply chain, from losing unit to gaining unit, to ensure we are achieving a “Velocity of Reset” commensurate with the demands of an ARFORGEN-based Army. The Army must also address life cycle management improvements to enable the Army to manage Friction better.

The Army must review Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP) and determine where, for specific LINs, we should accept prudent risk with a revised BOIP which relates to specific phases of ARFORGEN. For example:

- The Army could develop a strategy for Common Remotely Operated Stations (CROWS) that fills all MTOE requirements of units in the Available pool, half the units in the Train/Ready (future “Ready” pool), and a lesser number for the other units in the Train/Ready pool. This example of reducing the basis of issue to units in the Train/Ready and the Reset pools could achieve a cost avoidance of about $1 billion which could be applied to other Army priorities.

- Full BOIP application of the Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE) provides a GSE set to all 73 BCTs in the force, at a price in excess of $4 billion. Potentially, the Army could accept risk in the Reset pool and part of the Train/Ready pool by judiciously modifying the BOIP and reducing by billions of dollars GSE procurement costs.

The Army must reexamine some long-standing equipping programs and policies. Authorized Stock Funded Items on MTOEs and TDAs may not be as appropriate today as they were several years ago. Some Stock Funded Items should be placed on a Common Table of Allowances to allow the Commander to determine whether or not they are required, and in what quantity. The Army should consider whether to continue both requisition-based and push-based equipping for items on MTOEs. The Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) may not be configured to provide the necessary capabilities for rapid equipping of expeditionary forces in today’s security environment. These and other equipping related programs and policies must be reevaluated to ensure that they provide the right capabilities to support an ARFORGEN-Based Army in the current and projected security environment.

The Army must continue to update its readiness reporting system. Under the leadership of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3, the Army is refining its readiness reporting system to ensure reporting accurately reflects the readiness of units to perform their assigned missions under ARFORGEN. The implementation of directed C5 (e.g., no readiness expectation) reporting for units in the Reset phase of ARFORGEN is a significant
modification of Army adaption to cyclic readiness and equipping. Next, we will work to understand the ability to meet Train-Ready requirements better and reflect them in revised reporting instructions. Finally, we will need to describe and measure equipping readiness better in the combat zone.

• **Synchronizing equipping and strategy.** Even under ARFORGEN equipping, the Army must retain the capability to surge forces rapidly from within the Train-Ready Phase. This requires the ability to provide equipment from other parts of the force to generate this Strategic Depth. Additionally, the Army must account for the synchronization challenge of changes in Army force structure and capabilities requirements and their reliance on external funding and procurement processes. Rapid change in structure and the associated required capabilities can only be supported to the extent that the Programming, Funding, and Procurement processes, or existing Army inventories, can be energized in support. These processes must be closely synchronized to ensure continued readiness.

**RISK**

Any strategy involves risk. This strategy incurs risk in several areas. The risk is moderate and risk mitigation opportunities exist in each area. In this strategy, the risk is managed against specific mission requirements, by unit.

• **Generating Force Risk** – An initial goal of 65 percent of equipment fill for the Generating Force is perhaps the area of greatest risk within the strategy. However, for many of the equipping requirements within the Generating Force, the Army has sufficient equipment to meet its other requirements and still fill the Generating Force far in excess of the 65 percent minimum goal. When developed, future processes will ensure they are equipped to operational requirement, priority, and mission. As stated earlier, where equipping shortfalls require additional examination, the Army Campaign Plan, the AR2B, and other processes remain available to make specific resourcing/risk decisions.

• **Training Risk** – The Army has long insisted that Soldiers “train as they will fight.” The reduced equipping levels in the Train-Ready phase of ARFORGEN require Commanders to adapt and plan training aware of reduced expected levels of equipment fill. Because the equipping goals of this strategy provide some level of predictability, developing effective training should be achievable.

• **Strategic Depth** – One of the key factors of ARFORGEN has always been that when demand exceeded the available supply within the Available Pool, it would be possible to surge forces from the Train-Ready Pool. As the Army moves toward Balance in 2011, and as unit Boots On the Ground to Dwell time ratios move closer to a steady state level, Army equipping will be challenged to ensure that it can rapidly support the equipping of units from the Train-Ready Pool for surge operations in new areas of operation – areas absent existing TPE fleets and APS sets. Mitigation in this area can be achieved by temporarily shifting delivery of equipment from units preparing to exit Reset. The speed required for the surge and the mission requirements of the units involved will determine how effective this mitigation strategy can be.

• **HLD/DSCA Risk** - As ARNG units progress through the Reset and Train-Ready phases, they will be equipped at less than 100 percent. This represents risk in the ability to respond to HLD/DSCA requirements. Placing continuing emphasis on procurement and management of CDU items will help ensure that the necessary equipment is available for mission execution.
CONCLUSION

Persistent conflict creates a need for rapidly adaptable equipping to adjust to new capability requirements. It also brings increased Reset requirements, which, in turn, demand additional equipment inventories. Procurement of the equipment associated with the completion of the Army’s initial conversion to the modular force and completion of the Growth in the Army will be on-going through 2011 and beyond. Fiscal realities dictate that the Army must continue to be creative in managing equipment needed in its MTOE force and in its TDAs, while still providing the equipment necessary to resource TPE, account for LBE, provide necessary training sets, and ensure that combat-worn equipment has the opportunity to go through a full and complete Reset.

The Army’s Equipping Strategy is focused on ensuring that all Army units are “Equipped to Mission” and on building strategic depth. The three lines of operation in this strategy are designed to present the methodology the Army will use to accomplish this. First, the ARFORGEN-Based Equipping Goals establishes mission requirements in each phase of ARFORGEN.

Next, the Army uses equipment sets and other policies to manage friction. Finally, the Army moves from Equipping Balance into a future with higher levels of readiness and depth while also modernizing. These lines of operation establish the primary vision and guidelines. The Army will operationalize them, primarily, by the work of the Army’s Materiel and Readiness Core Enterprises, and in annually updated annexes within the Army Campaign Plan. Most importantly, they will be operationalized as we institutionalize the culture of equipment stewardship and ARFORGEN-based equipping.

The Army measures success by contributing to overall Army readiness while supporting a cost culture. As we move toward the goal of increased readiness, Soldiers and Commanders should have clear expectations regarding what levels of equipment they will receive – and when. Commands and staffs should have a clear understanding of how to allocate equipment most efficiently and effectively to support Army training and readiness goals. Together, and with the Army’s support, this strategy will ensure that the American Soldier remains the best equipped warrior in the world. ★★★
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Army Equipping Strategy

1. The Chief of Staff of the Army has approved the attached strategy which describes the ends, ways, and means the Army will use to achieve equipping balance by Fiscal Year 2011. It presents the concepts by which the Army will adjust its equipping processes, organizations, and expectations to achieve equipping balance and to position itself for the long term as an ARFORGEN-based force.

2. This is a strategy that seeks to ensure Soldiers have the right amount and type of modernized equipment to meet their mission requirements – whether in combat, training for combat, operating as part of the generating force, or conducting Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civilian Agencies missions.

3. Although issued from this office, this strategy is the result of a collaborative effort incorporating inputs from across the Army – Army Service Component Commands, Army Commands, Reserve Components, and the Army Staff. It has been coordinated at Army Equipping Enterprise and Reuse Conferences and in numerous teleconferences with, and briefings to, stakeholders. It is a product of the Army for the Army.

4. This strategy is effective immediately. Local reproduction is authorized to achieve maximum promulgation throughout the Army.

5. The POC for this action is COL David Komar, DAPR-FDP, (703) 695-4593.

Encl

as

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Lieutenant General, GS  
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